Case Study 2
In this example, Russ Hoover (RH) shows how to disengage the alarm while not allowing the use of defence mechanisms such as minimisation, denial and rationalisation which avoid the impact and seriousness of the original complaint for the client.Betty, late 50s, had worked in a restaurant for about 3 months and had suddenly been confronted with a 16-year-old male doing the same work as she was. He had made the job look so easy, joked about how simple the job really was and made all the difficult parts of the job look very easy.
However, Betty found the job required a great deal of concentration and didn't find it easy at all. But his care-free attitude to the job had shaken her confidence and brought on deep feelings of inadequacy and low self-esteem.
She's been stewing about the whole matter and we pick the transcript up with RH asking her:
RH: And I notice that you haven't been able to shake off this feeling we've talked about?
Betty (B): No. I haven't been able to get it out of my mind. I guess I knew I wasn't doing very well at my job and this situation brought it home to me.
RH: And do you know why you are thinking about it so much?
B: Well, no.
RH: It's because of the psychological alarm. Have you ever heard of that?
B: Yes. I read the book. (She is referring to a copy of the present book which RH had recommended she read.)
RH: So something in this whole incident alerted you to something bad that could endanger you. A good warning system tells us about potential danger because if it waited until we knew it was a danger it might be too late. [That is, the alarm precedes the knowledge of the potential danger.] If you knew you could do what this young man could do then the alarm would have been turned off. But in this case, it was something bad about you that alarmed you; so what did your attention focus on?
B: That I wasn't able to do the things he was doing and that kept my attention.
RH: Precisely. Just as a reminder, you can never be alarmed over any potential you might know to be good/okay; good potentials have no warning system and in fact, de-activate alarms. You probably sense that feeling inferior is not something good or you wouldn't be talking to me now.
B: I just hate it.
RH: If feeling inferior were okay we'd be trying to get you feel that way more often. So if we try to get rid of that low self-esteem, under what conditions will we be trying to get rid of it?
B: (pauses) Under what conditions? I don't know what you mean. [And we might not either! Maybe better if he had said, 'Under what circumstances . . . . etc.]
RH: Well we wouldn't be trying to get you over the sense of inadequacy under conditions that don't make you feel that way would we? We'll only be trying to get you over the feeling under conditions that make you feel inferior, not anything else?
B: Yeah. That's makes sense.
RH: It might even help to list all the conditions [situations] that don't produce any sense of inadequacy such as when you are doing well or better than others or when inadequacy doesn't matter that much. None of those conditions produce bad feelings do they?
B: No.
RH then formulates a treatment goal as: 'our goal is to [control] your sense of inadequacy only [in] conditions that create that sense of inadequacy' (p. 89). She is happy with that. And he gets her to spell out that the conditions in focus are like those that she encountered in the restaurant the other day.
He then explains that it's not good to try to reduce feelings of inadequacy when the feelings are justifiable. [By the way, it's notable in this therapy that a large amount of repetition is used to make sure the therapy goal and the means towards reaching the goal are not lost to sight.]
She accepts the clarified therapy goal but is doubtful about how they are going to fulfill it.
The words underlined in the subsequent dialogue are what he calls 'antagonists' (see earlier posts) because they antagonise or act against the mood inducing a reduction in its intensity.
RH: What if you declared, silently to yourself, it's not reasonable or understandable for me to be performing okay? It makes perfect sense I perform a second-rate job in this circumstance. How would you feel then?
B: (hesitating) It wouldn't bother me anymore.
RH: Why wouldn't it bother you anymore? Do you know?
B: No, not really.
RH: How much can you get bothered about something you know to be perfectly reasonable?
B: I don't think you can.
RH: And what if the thing you know to be reasonable [feeling inferior] is something very bad, something you hate about yourself?
B: But it's reasonable?
RH: Yes. Absolutely reasonable though you loathe it.
B: Well, I don't think you'd bother about it so much.
RH: Right but remember it can't be really acceptable to you because then you couldn't have got bothered about it in the first place. All you'd be doing is shifting your values and making something you now believe is bad into something neutral or okay. But remember now: what did we do before to ANTAGONISE the bothered feeling you felt when you realised your actions were not up to scratch?
B: Well, seeing it's unreasonable.
RH: Yes, it's very unreasonable for me to be bright and witty and to have a lot to say. Now how would you use that with reference to what happened to you in the restaurant?
B: That it's unreasonable to be doing things as well as he is.
RH: And how would you then feel?
B: Not so bothered.
RH: Right. You wouldn't feel so bothered unless that wasn't the real issue.
[What RH is doing at this point is to make sure that he is addressing the correct part of the situation that is causing her the upset.]
RH: For example, the real issue might be not your in adequate performance but the fact that others might look down on you as a consequence. So they're thinking you're incompetent. How would you deal with that if it were the actual issue?
B: I don't know.
RH: You'd use the same strategy. You could ask, is it logical for people to look favourably on me and think me competent?
B: Well, no; not all the time.
RH: So then, if you didn't think you were doing too well then it doesn't seem to follow that they would either. And knowing that, how do you feel?
B: At the moment I don't feel upset.
RH: So, it's beginning to reduce feeling bothered under the conditions where the bother is usually created. Later we'll come back to that again and make sure it's second nature for you. But right now, we going to look at something else you said: the feeling of inferiority which can't be okay or all right or you wouldn't be upset by it. Our treatment goal is to reduce the upset to something that's not okay anyway. 'But how do people feel when they see something shamefully unacceptable about themselves at a time that it in some way matters to them?' (p. 92).
B: They feel bad and down on themselves.
RH: 'Right, unless they did what you did before which retracts [antagonises] the mood that corresponds with that condition' (p.92). For example, what if you knew if wasn't fitting or sane for me to feel okay about myself all the time; that it's quite sane for me to feel bad when I do.
He has her repeat the words in the example and challenges her about the truth of them. She affirms their truth but when he asks for a basis she replies that we can't feel good about ourselves all the time because it's hard to do. His rejoinder is that because we are flawed [affected by the Fall] and recognise our shortcomings then we're bound to feel bad which is completely proper.
And paradoxically, accepting our feeling bad as being completely proper allows the badness feeling to slip away. Trying to get rid of it only stirs it up and increases it.
The Vehicles
In this closing part of the main body of the book--he has detailed appendices as well--he draws a sharp distinction between vehicles and their loads and applies that distinction to the psychotherapeutic situation.He warns of the danger of confusing such things as humour, analogy, persuasion, rapport and question and answer with psychotherapy. For the former are simply means of conversation and not treatment. The former simply deliver the treatment but are not that treatment themselves.
Particularly he attacks strongly the idea that humour is 'the best medicine' as applicable to the more serious job of psychotherapy which he has outlined in his book.
In my final two posts on this book, I will examine first an appendix entitled, Therapeutic Pretensions. In the final post, on a section Non-Therapeutic Dialogs (sic). The latter is important because it contrasts his views sharply with cognitive therapy.